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I. INTRODUCTION 
Detention at Guantanamo, targeting of individuals with drones, use 
of civilians to warn the targets of military operations, use of military com-
missions—courts in the United States and abroad have grappled with these 
and other questions extensively over the past decade and more. These is-
sues, and others that arise in the course of armed conflict and counterterror-
ism operations, bring the role of national courts in the implementation and 
enforcement of international humanitarian law into direct relief. Courts 
faced with wartime cases encounter two critical determinations before even 
reaching the merits of the case: whether to apply international humanitarian 
law, and if so, to what extent. The answers to those two questions will likely 
have a major impact on the disposition of the case. 
International humanitarian law (IHL)—otherwise known as the law 
of armed conflict or the law of war—governs the conduct of both states and 
individuals during armed conflict and seeks to minimize suffering in war by 
protecting persons not participating in hostilities and by restricting the 
means and methods of warfare.1 A variety of courts and judicial mecha-
  
 * Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory University School of Law. 
 1 See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], What is International Humanitarian Law 
(July 2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf. The law of armed 
conflict is set forth primarily in the four Geneva Conventions of August 14, 1949 and their 
Additional Protocols. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention 
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nisms apply and enforce IHL during and after armed conflict: national 
courts; courts-martial; military commissions; regional courts; international 
tribunals; and hybrid tribunals, to name a few.
 
 With the exception of na-
tional and regional courts, the remaining courts and tribunals are specifical-
ly designed or constituted to apply the law of war to persons and actions 
during wartime. Regional courts will usually operate within the human 
rights paradigm, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or the 
European Court of Human Rights.
 
 In contrast, national courts have no spe-
cial jurisdiction over law of war issues or over military personnel. Under-
standing when, why and how they apply—or perhaps refuse to apply—IHL 
is thus an essential task.  
Any actors engaged in the implementation or enforcement of IHL—
whether lawyers, military operators, political leaders, or others—must have 
a clear understanding of how their national courts will approach cases in-
volving IHL. This essay will analyze what factors courts to choose to ap-
ply—or not apply—IHL and how much of it they will apply. Knowing how 
the law actually applies to the facts at hand is, of course, critical to the prep-
aration of any case, military operation, advocacy campaign, or other action. 
In the IHL paradigm, however, this analysis must go beyond the specific 
substantive law. A court’s initial decision about whether to apply IHL or to 
what extent it applies, relative to national human rights law, for example, 
will have a significant effect on the merits of the case. Because the pro-
cess—which law and how much law—is substantively determinative, on a 
broad strategic level, predicting or understanding how courts will approach 
the legal framework as cases arise is important for effective advocacy, oper-
ational and political decision-making and long-term legal analysis. 
This analysis plays an important role in three main areas. First, liti-
gation strategy requires that lawyers know more than simply how the law 
applies to the facts. Knowing how the court will approach a relevant legal 
regime impacts a range of strategic issues in litigation, from the choice of 
court (if applicable) to decisions about how to present the case and which 
issues to emphasize. For example, courts in the United States tend to be 
reluctant to interfere in wartime decision-making and frequently invoke the 
political question doctrine in declining to adjudicate such cases. Courts in 
  
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [here-
inafter Protocol II]. This essay will use the terms law of war and IHL interchangeably. 
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Israel, for example, take the opposite approach, implementing robust judi-
cial review and hearing cases in real time during military operations. Euro-
pean courts often have a different focus, driven by the binding oversight and 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which leads to a 
more human rights-based approach to national security issues. There is little 
doubt that to pursue an effective litigation strategy in any of these courts, 
parties must understand and take advantage of that court’s specific motiva-
tion, past trends and likely focus, in order to be effective.  
Second, jurisprudential predictability has significant value as well. 
Lower courts will generally seek guidance on how the highest court or 
courts will rule, not only in terms of specific decisions on the merits, but 
with regard to what law they apply and how they view the overall legal par-
adigm. Judges therefore can benefit from a framework or set of factors that 
offer a more nuanced understanding of how other courts treat IHL. This 
jurisprudential predictability extends outside the judiciary as well, however. 
Any relevant individuals or organizations—lawyers trying cases, military 
lawyers advising commanders, political leaders debating strategy or legisla-
tion, advocates and others—rely on regular and predictable application of 
the law for effective decision-making and advocacy. 
Finally, the third area in which a strategic analytical approach to the 
way that courts approach IHL is useful is the overall development of IHL. 
As the debates and controversies of the past decade demonstrate, new types 
of conflict, new weapons and new tactics all stretch the law in various direc-
tions and demand continuing reaffirmation of key principles and reconsider-
ation of how to apply the law most effectively to meet its goals. When 
courts simply refuse to apply IHL or apply it in a limited manner in con-
junction with other legal regimes—for a variety of reasons analyzed be-
low—the failure to tackle new challenges can stunt the development of the 
law. IHL’s development and effectiveness will be richest when courts of all 
kinds, whether national, regional or international, address current complexi-
ties and controversies head-on and grapple with how to maintain IHL’s cen-
tral goals of civilian protection and lawful conduct of hostilities even in the 
face of new challenges. In the broadest sense, therefore, understanding how 
and why courts do or do not apply IHL, and to what extent, in particular 
situations can help trigger deeper understandings of how the law is likely to 
develop and what its impact will be in the future. 
Many scholars have analyzed the substantive manner in which 
courts have applied IHL in particular cases.2 These analyses are critical to 
  
 2 See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and 
International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241 (2008); David Weissbrodt & 
Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, The Role of the United States Supreme Court in Interpreting and De-
veloping Humanitarian Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1339 (2011); Dominic McGoldrick, Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law in the U.K. Courts, 40 ISR. L. REV. 527 (2007); Tristan Ferra-
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understanding both the past and future path of the law. However, they do 
not offer the broader strategic understanding necessary to fulfill the three 
goals above. Doing so requires a threshold analysis of: 1) when and whether 
national courts will hear cases involving conflict, national security and IHL 
issues; and 2) whether courts will apply IHL rather than, or in conjunction 
with, other applicable legal regimes, such as human rights law or specific 
domestic legal paradigms.  
The first section will address three categories of legal regimes that 
raise questions regarding the application of IHL in domestic courts. In es-
sence, these form either a threshold analysis for identifying prime opportu-
nities for courts to contribute to the development of IHL or, from the oppo-
site perspective, missed opportunities where courts refrain from engaging 
with the law of war altogether. The second section will highlight and devel-
op a range of considerations that inform how we can analyze the role of 
national courts in the application and implementation of IHL. Together, 
these two levels of analysis offer tools for understanding both the likelihood 
of national court decisions on law of war matters and the effectiveness, at 
home and abroad, of such decisions. 
II. THRESHOLD FOR ANALYSIS 
Just as courts need to assess when IHL applies in a particular case, 
so any analysis of judicial trends must start with that question. The first step 
is to identify the types of cases that pose or potentially pose IHL issues be-
fore national courts. The three main areas for consideration are: the exist-
ence of a conflict; the type of conflict; and key issues that stem from con-
flict situations. Each of these will produce different degrees of willingness 
on the part of national courts to tackle IHL. In addition, some will require 
that courts apply IHL in order to reach any type of determination at all; oth-
ers will seem amenable to resolution in the absence of any reference to IHL. 
In all situations, this threshold analysis helps in understanding whether and 
how a relevant court will address IHL in the context of a particular case and 
in using that information effectively.  
A. Existence of a Conflict 
States deploy military forces in a wide range of situations encom-
passing far more than what might traditionally be termed “war.” Disaster 
relief, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, counterterrorism operations—
these can all involve significant commitment of human, materiel and tech-
nological military resources—and yet such operations will not necessarily 
  
ro, Enforcement of Occupation Law in Domestic Courts: Issues and Opportunities, 41 ISR. L. 
REV. 331 (2008). 
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engage legal obligations under IHL. The law of armed conflict applies only 
during armed conflict, not during peacetime, so any court faced with poten-
tial IHL questions must first determine whether there is an armed conflict 
that will trigger the applicability of IHL. The Geneva Conventions create a 
framework of law applicable based on the situation on the ground, not based 
on the claims or objectives of the parties to the conflict.3 Even before the 
current Geneva Conventions framework was in place, when states often 
argued that there was no conflict in the absence of a declaration of war, de-
terminations about the applicability of the law of war generally turned on an 
objective determination of the facts rather than on the subjective pro-
nouncements of states.4 Notably, the Geneva Conventions adopted the term 
“armed conflict” specifically to avoid the technical legal and political pit-
falls of the term “war.”5
 
As such, determination of the existence of an armed 
conflict does not turn on a formal declaration of war—or even on how the 
participants characterize the hostilities—but rather is based on the facts of a 
given situation.6 In most cases, the key analytical question will generally be 
  
 3 See generally OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION IV 
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet ed., 
1958). 
 4 For example, during World War II, the Japanese claimed that their operations in China 
and Manchuria were “police operations” and therefore did not trigger the law of war. See 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East: Judgment of 12 November 1948, in 22 
TOKYO WAR CRIME TRIALS  49,594 (John Pritchard & Sonia M. Zaide eds., 1998), available 
at http://werle.rewi.hu-berlin.de/tokio.pdf.  
From the outbreak of the Mukden Incident till the end of the war, the successive 
Japanese Governments refused to acknowledge that the hostilities in China consti-
tuted a war. They persistently called it an ‘Incident.’ With this as an excuse, the 
military authorities persistently asserted that the rules of war did not apply in the 
conduct of the hostilities.  
Id.; see also The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. 635, 646–98 (1862) (dis-
cussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s assessment of the existence of a war based on the facts on 
the ground, referring explicitly to the law of nations); Montoya v. United States, 280 U.S. 
261, 267 (1901).  
We recall no instance where Congress has made a formal declaration of war 
against an Indian nation or tribe; but the fact that Indians are engaged in acts of 
general hostility to settlers, especially if the government has deemed it necessary to 
despatch [sic] a military force for their subjugation, is sufficient to constitute a 
state of war. 
Id. 
 5 See generally UHLER ET AL., supra note 3, at 17–25 (addressing Common Article 2 to 
the Geneva Conventions). 
 6 See, e.g., Anthony Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed 
Conflict in International Humanitarian Law, 183 MIL. L. REV. 66, 85 (2005) (“[I]t is worth 
emphasizing that recognition of the existence of armed conflict is not a matter of state discre-
tion.”); see also UHLER ET AL., supra note 3, at 17 (“[T]he [Geneva] Convention[s] . . . apply 
to all cases of declared war or . . . armed conflict . . . between two or more [states] . . . even if 
the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”).  
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whether the hostilities or situation at issue rises above internal disturbances, 
riots and banditry, which do not constitute armed conflict.7  
For these reasons, cases in which the existence of an armed conflict 
is in dispute or uncertain are the first category of situations in which nation-
al courts encounter IHL. As the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) declared, in a statement that applies as much to national courts as to 
an international tribunal: 
If the application of international humanitarian law depended solely on the 
discretionary judgment of the parties to the conflict, in most cases there 
would be a tendency for the conflict to be minimized by the parties there-
to. Thus, on the basis of objective criteria, [IHL] will apply once it has 




The question of the existence of an armed conflict can manifest it-
self in a national court environment in various ways beyond a straightfor-
ward preliminary jurisdictional analysis. For example, a court may declare 
the existence of a conflict that triggers the application of IHL in direct con-
travention to the executive’s statements to the contrary.9
 
In other situations, 
courts may simply follow the lead of the executive and ignore the potential 
application of IHL, such as in the numerous cases addressing questions aris-
ing from the conflict in Northern Ireland.10
 
The consequences of different 
  
 7 See, e.g., Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98 doc. 6 rev. ¶¶ 14852 (1997), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/ 
annualrep/97eng/Argen tina11137.htm (characterizing the armed confrontation in La Tablada 
as an “armed conflict of a non-international character” rather than an internal disturbance). 
 8 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 603 (Sept. 2, 1998), 
http://www.un.org/ictr/english/judgements/akayesu.html. 
 9 See, e.g., Constantin von der Groeben, The Conflict in Colombia and the Relationship 
between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Practice: Analysis of the New Opera-
tional Law of the Colombian Armed Forces, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 141, 145 n. 18 
(2011) (discussing judgments of the Constitutional Court of Colombia holding that the Co-
lombian government is engaged in an armed conflict with the FARC and other guerrilla 
groups); see also Paola Gaeta, The Armed Conflict in Chechnya Before the Russian Constitu-
tional Court, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 563, 566–70 (1996) (discussing Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation July 13, 1995 decision on the application of Additional Protocol II to the 
conflict in Chechnya). 
 10 See Noelle Quénivet, The Application of International Humanitarian Law to Situations 
of a (Counter-) Terrorist Nature, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE 21ST 
CENTURY’S CONFLICTS 25, 31 (Roberta Arnold & Pierre-Antoine Hildbrand eds., 2005). The 
Russian Government has also consistently denied that the hostilities in Chechnya constitute 
an armed conflict. See William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: 
The European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 741, 754 (2005). In a 
third approach, “[t]he situation in Colombia is . . . one in which the State does not recognize 
the existence of an armed conflict, but still acts as if it were the case, including as regards the 
application of IHL.” von der Groeben, supra note 9, at 149. 
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court approaches to the existence of an armed conflict are clear: if courts do 
not engage the issue at all, the executive’s determination will govern regard-
ing both the absence of any conflict and thus the applicable law;
 
if courts 
engage the issue and find that an armed conflict does exist, IHL will be the 
governing legal regime. On a range of issues, from detention to trial to sta-
tus of persons, outcomes will differ depending on the applicable legal re-
gime. 
From a strategic perspective, if a court demonstrates a propensity to 
follow the executive’s lead, relying solely on IHL for the substantive legal 
arguments would likely not be the most effective approach because the 
court will likely conclude that there is no armed conflict—consistent with 
the executive’s argument—and reject any IHL-based arguments. The con-
sequences for the long-term development of the law are obvious: when na-
tional courts refrain from applying IHL in relevant situations, they are effec-
tively abdicating their responsibility to implement and enforce IHL, leaving 
the executive to be the driving force in the development of the law, a highly 
problematic result. 
B. Types of Conflicts 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions established a two-pronged approach 
to armed conflict and the application of IHL to the parties and events so 
engaged. Under the Geneva Conventions framework, any armed conflict 
will be either an international armed conflict falling within Common Article 
2 or a non-international armed conflict falling with Common Article 3.
11 
The former conflicts trigger the full panoply of the law of war, including the 
four Geneva Conventions and customary international law.12
 
In non-
international conflicts, only Common Article 3 and the customary interna-
tional law applicable in such conflicts will apply, including the principles of 
humanity, proportionality, distinction, and necessity.13 States, courts, and 
  
 11 See Common Articles 2 and 3 to the four Geneva Conventions. Geneva Convention I, 
supra note 1, arts. 2–3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 1, arts. 2–3; Geneva Convention 
III, supra note 1, arts. 2–3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, arts. 2–3; UHLER ET AL., 
supra note 3, at 17–25. 
 12 See Geneva Convention I, supra note 1, art. 2; Geneva Convention II, supra note 1, art. 
2; Geneva Convention III, supra note 1, art. 2; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, art. 2. 
 13 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Defence Motion for Interloc-
utory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 102–27 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 
1995) (highlighting the development and applicability of necessity, distinction, humanity, 
and proportionality to internal armed conflict); Abella v. Argentina, supra note 7, ¶¶ 176–77 
(discussing applicability of customary law to all armed conflicts); LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW 
OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 133–34 (2002) (arguing that customary law is the only au-
thority that can temper internal conflicts based on the principle of humanity and proportion-
ality); Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Tadic Decision, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
265, 275–78 (1996). In the case of non-international conflicts occurring in the territory of a 
 
File: Blank 2 Created on:  2/19/2012 9:27:00 AM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:51:00 PM 
212 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:205 
organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
have frequently characterized situations as armed conflict and specified 
whether they constituted international or non-international armed conflict in 
the years after 1949.14 Just as the existence of an armed conflict triggers the 
application of IHL to govern the status of persons and the rights and obliga-
tions of parties to the conflict, so the nature of the conflict—whether inter-
national or non-international—determines the extent of the applicable law.  
The definition of armed conflict, as set forth by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is the “resort to armed 
force between states or protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a 
state.”15
 
The first portion of the definition refers to international armed con-
flict; the second to non-international armed conflict.
 
International tribunals, 
whose jurisdiction depends solely on the existence of armed conflict and the 
nature of the conflict, naturally devote considerable judicial energy to the 
determination of conflict and conflict status. But national courts also play an 
important role here. Whereas distinguishing between international and non-
international armed conflict may have been reasonably straightforward in 
the past, the advent of conflict between states and non-state actors across 
state borders has begun to blur the lines and create confusion regarding the 
nature of the conflict and thus the applicable law. For example, the U.S. 
conflict with al Qaeda and other terrorist groups has been characterized al-
ternatively as: not a conflict; a transnational armed conflict; a non-
international armed conflict; and an international armed conflict.16 Ultimate-
  
State party to Additional Protocol II where the situation on the ground meets the require-
ments of Article 1 of Additional Protocol II, the more detailed provisions of Protocol II will 
apply. See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 1995, Senten-
cia C-225/95, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (p. 104) (Colom.), 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1995/c-225-95.htm (highlighting the im-
portance of the principle of distinction in internal armed conflict); see also Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, supra note 8, ¶ 601 (noting that Common Article 3 extends a minimum threshold 
of protection to all persons in non-international armed conflict). 
 14 See, e.g., Int’l Comm. of The Red Cross [ICRC], Summary Report: Afghanistan, Co-
lombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, and the Phil-
ippines 10–25 (2009), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/our_world_-_views_from_ 
countries_-_summary_report_-_part_2_bkmrk.pdf (identifying various armed conflicts in 
Afghanistan and non-international armed conflict in Colombia); Tom Farer, Humanitarian 
Law and Armed Conflicts: Toward the Definition of International Armed Conflict 71 COLUM. 
L. REV. 37, 57–58 (1971) (addressing ICRC categorization of the Vietnam War beginning in 
1965 as international armed conflict). 
 15 Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 13, ¶ 70. 
 16 Compare Silvia Borelli, Casting Light on the Legal Black Hole: International Law and 
Detentions Abroad in the “War on Terror,” 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 39, 45–46 (2005), 
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_857_borelli.pdf (arguing that the 
“war on terror” cannot in and of itself constitute an armed conflict within the meaning of the 
law of war), and Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Chal-
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ly, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the conflict 
with al Qaeda constitutes an armed conflict of a non-international character 
governed by Common Article 3.17 Note, however, that the appeals court in 
Hamdan held that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the conflict with 
al Qaeda because it did not fit within either the Common Article 2 or Com-
mon Article 3 paradigms.18 The difference in how post-Hamdan jurispru-
dence and legislation would look if that holding were the final holding is 
dramatic. In a different approach, the Israeli Supreme Court characterizes 
Israel’s conflict with Hamas and other armed Palestinian groups as an inter-
national armed conflict.19
 
Each of these determinations then affects how the 
law is applied to individuals and to state action during conflict. The status of 
individuals, such as prisoner of war status and protected person status, of-
fers a prime example of the difference in legal application between the two 
categories of conflict,20
 
as does the nature of the detaining party’s obliga-
  
lenges from the “War on Terror,” 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 57–58 (2003), available 
at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/rona_terror.pdf (noting that while certain aspects 
of the “war on terror” do fall within the category of armed conflict, others do not; such that 
using the terminology of “war” does not make automatically make it an armed conflict), with 
Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 33–35 (2003) (argu-
ing that the law of war governs the September 11th attacks and the military operations in 
response); compare MICHAEL W. LEWIS ET AL., THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: 
A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 9 (2009) (discussing the application of the law of armed conflict to 
a range of military operations and concluding that, at a minimum, the conflict between the 
U.S. and al Qaeda and other groups constitutes a transnational armed conflict triggering 
fundamental principles of the law of war), and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 
(2006) (holding that the conflict with al Qaeda is a non-international armed conflict within 
the definition of common Article 3), with U.S. GOV’T, REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPORT OF THE FIVE UNHCR SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS ON 
DETAINEES IN GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA 4 (Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://www.asil. 
org/pdfs/ilib0603212.pdf (“The United States is engaged in a continuing armed conflict 
against Al Qaida, the Taliban and other terrorist organizations supporting them, with troops 
on the ground in several places engaged in combat operations.”). 
 17 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631.  
 18 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (explaining arguendo that even 
if the Geneva Convention could be enforced in this court, it would not help Hamdan).  
 19 HCJ 769/02, Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel, 
¶16 [Dec. 11, 2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/ 
02007690.a34.pdf (describing the situation between Israel and various terrorists groups as 
one of continuous international armed conflict).  
 20 See Waldemar Solf, Problems with the Application of Norms Governing Interstate 
Armed Conflict to Non-International Armed Conflict, 13 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 291, 291–
93 (1983) (discussing the differences in the rules governing international and non-
international conflicts pertaining to prisoners of war).  
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tions or the judicial mechanism used for trying alleged perpetrators of law 
of war violations.21 
The role that courts can play in identifying the nature of the conflict 
thus expands in today’s world of complex conflict situations. National 
courts that hear cases potentially triggering the application of the law of war 
are in a position to analyze how the law applies to counterterrorism opera-
tions, humanitarian interventions, operations in collective self-defense and 
other equally challenging situations. In this way, courts have a unique op-
portunity to further the development of IHL and to help continue to define 
and understand the geographic, temporal and other parameters of conflict.  
C. Issues Arising During Conflict 
Among the wide range of issues that arise during armed conflict, 
national courts will usually be willing to adjudicate some rather than others. 
The likelihood of a court decision infringing on executive authority or su-
premacy in a particular area is often a deciding factor in how courts choose 
to treat these cases. For example, courts will usually refrain from hearing 
cases regarding the targeting of specific enemy property, on the theory that 
such decisions are wholly within the parameters of the executive’s war-
making authority.22 And yet a court’s involvement—or lack thereof—will 
have major consequences for the protection of individual rights and the en-
forcement of obligations. Parties to a case will need to strategize, based on 
an assessment of the court’s receptivity to certain issues, regarding how best 
to present their case; while IHL may offer the strongest substantive case, if 
a court is reluctant to apply IHL—such as in targeting cases—then the ar-
guments must rest on other legal bases as well. Political and military leaders 
will also take their cue from the judiciary’s approach, knowing, in some 
countries, that in certain areas they will have nearly complete freedom of 
action without any judicial oversight. From a systemic perspective, this ju-
dicial deference is highly problematic for the enforcement and future devel-
opment of the law, as seen in the contrast between the unwillingness of U.S. 
courts to engage the executive with judicial review and the robust judicial 
activism of the Israeli Supreme Court. 
The following six issues offer prime examples: 
In the area of detention, IHL provides the legal framework in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts. In an international 
  
 21 See Laura Lopez, Note, Uncivil Wars: The Challenge of Applying International Human-
itarian Law to Internal Armed Conflicts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 916, 918 (1994) (discussing four 
major inadequacies of the Geneva Convention when applied to internal armed conflict).  
 22 See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1365–
66 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that the decision to destroy property was a “strategic matter of 
war-making belonging [to the President],” as a part of his executive authority). 
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armed conflict or an occupation, IHL—particularly the Third and Fourth 
Geneva Conventions—provides for the detention of combatants, civilians 
who directly participate in hostilities, and civilians not directly participating 
in hostilities but who pose a threat to the security of the occupying power.23 
The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions provide extensive safeguards 
and procedures for such detention.24 Authority to detain in non-international 
armed conflict, while not delineated specifically in any treaty provision, is 
based on the fundamental principle of military necessity.25 Such detention is 
governed by domestic law, which may incorporate or be informed by hu-
man rights provisions and the due process requirements set forth in the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example.26 Similarly, 
in non-conflict scenarios, the domestic law of the host state regulates deten-
tion, but human rights law provides minimum standards of conduct.27 
The trial of detainees—and the nature and amount of process af-
forded to them—depends both on the character of the conflict and status of 
the detainee. In international armed conflicts, including occupation, the trial 
of prisoners of war is strictly regulated by the Third Geneva Convention.28 
IHL applicable during a non-international armed conflict, on the other hand, 
including Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II and customary interna-
tional humanitarian law, offers little guidance for trials of either persons 
who are fighting or other individuals.29 One significant difference is that 
individuals engaged in a non-international armed conflict are not protected 
  
 23 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 1, art. 4 (setting forth the categories of persons 
who qualify for prisoner of war status); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, arts. 42, 78 
(providing for the internment of protected persons for imperative reasons of security).  
 24 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 1; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1.  
 25 See CHATHAM HOUSE & INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS FOR 
SECURITY DETENTION IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 5–6 (2008); Geoffrey S. 
Corn, The Problem with Law Avoidance, NAT’L SEC. L. REP., Winter 2010, at 4–8. 
 26 See Ashley S. Deeks, Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 403, 413 (2009); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, opened 
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 26, 1976) [hereinaf-
ter ICCPR].  Note also that the law of international armed conflict can provide useful analo-
gies and guidance for exploring the parameters of detention in non-international armed con-
flict.  See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, “Article” The Second Annual Solf-Warren Lecture in Inter-
national and Operational Law, 201 MIL. L. REV. 237, 240–42 (Fall 2009).  
 27 See ICCPR, supra note 26, art 9.  
 28 Geneva Convention III, supra note 1, arts. 99–108. 
 29 See Laura M. Olson, Practical Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity Be-
tween International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law—Demonstrated by the Procedur-
al Regulations of Internment in Non-International Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 437, 442 (2009) (“The Second Additional Protocol applicable in non-international armed 
conflict briefly mentions internment, but provides no guidance regarding procedures either to 
assess the decision to intern or to terminate captivity. Again, Common Article 3 does not 
speak to the issue.”). 
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by combatant immunity, meaning they may be tried under domestic law for 
murder for engaging in acts which, had they been committed by a combat-
ant, would be considered lawful.30  
During armed conflict, IHL permits the targeting of enemy persons 
and military objectives with lethal force as a first resort.31 IHL’s fundamen-
tal principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack guide 
the use of force and targeting considerations in all situations.32 Outside of an 
armed conflict, human rights law governs and the use of lethal force is se-
verely restricted, limited to situations of necessity or self-defense in accord-
ance with traditional law enforcement principles.33 As noted above, the U.S. 
  
 30 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT 28 (2004) (citing A. ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR: A 
STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 82 
(1976)); see also Geneva Convention III, supra note 1, arts. 87, 99; United States v. John 
Walker Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, (E.D. Va. 2002).  
Lawful combatant immunity, a doctrine rooted in the customary international law 
of war, forbids prosecution of soldiers for their lawful belligerent acts committed 
during the course of armed conflicts against legitimate military targets.  Belligerent 
acts committed in armed conflict by enemy members of the armed forces may be 
punished as crimes under a belligerent's municipal law only to the extent that they 
violate international humanitarian law or are unrelated to the armed conflict.  This 
doctrine has a long history, which is reflected in part in various early international 
conventions, statutes and documents. 
Id.; see also John P. Cerone, Status of Detainees in Non-International Armed Conflict, and 
Their Protection in the Course of Criminal Proceedings: The Case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. INSIGHTS (July 14, 2006), http://www.asil.org/insights060714.cfm 
(noting that “non-state combatants in a non-international armed conflict may be prosecuted 
for all hostile acts, including violations of ordinary domestic law, irrespective of whether 
they have violated any norms of international law.”). 
 31 See Geoffrey S. Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Apply-
ing Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 52 
(2010). 
 32 Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan, 39 
ISR. YBK. HUM.RTS. 99 (2009) (“Although the conflict [in Afghanistan] has become non-
international, it must be understood that the IHL norms governing attacks in international 
armed conflicts, on one hand, and  non-international armed conflicts, on the other, have 
become nearly indistinguishable.”).  
 33 ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 6; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms art. 2(2), opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, preamble, 213 U.N.T.S. 
222 (Council of Europe) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); see also U.N. Basic Principles on 
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Principle 9, G.A. Res. 45/166 
(Dec. 18, 1999). 
[Force can only be used] in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent 
threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious 
crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and 
resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when the less ex-
treme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives.  
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and some other domestic courts are reluctant to address targeting questions 
at all, leaving them to executive discretion.34 
The status of persons depends greatly on the applicable law, wheth-
er IHL or human rights law, and also whether it is the law of international 
armed conflict or non-international armed conflict. In order to determine a 
person’s rights, a court must first analyze the person’s status—and here 
domestic courts have often been willing to engage in precisely that determi-
nation.35 For example, the post-Boumediene litigation in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia has focused extensively on the status of 
persons captured and detained in the course of the conflict with al Qaeda 
and other terrorist groups; the authority for detention depends directly on 
such status determinations.36 In addition, the reluctance or willingness of 
courts to address status questions is a clear indicator of the likelihood of the 
court applying IHL. For decades, the Israeli Supreme Court has assessed the 
status of persons detained and tried in the course of its conflicts with Pales-
tinian armed groups, using IHL to determine how to categorize such persons 
and the rights to which they are entitled.37 In contrast, courts in the United 
  
Id.; see also David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Exe-
cutions or Legitimate Means of Defense?, 16 EUR J. INT’L L. 171, 176 (2005). 
Under [international human rights law,] the intentional use of lethal force by state 
authorities can be justified only in strictly limited conditions. The state is obliged 
to respect and ensure the rights of every person to life and to due process of law. 
Any intentional use of lethal force by state authorities that is not justified under the 
provisions regarding the right to life, will, by definition, be regarded as an ‘extra-
judicial execution. 
Id. 
 34 Compare Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that the plain-
tiff lacked standing to challenge, on behalf of his adult son, the government’s authority to 
engage in targeted killings of U.S. citizens outside of armed conflict zones and noting that 
the issue would likely not survive a political question analysis), with HCJ 769/02, Public 
Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel, ¶ 10 (analyzing the legali-
ty of targeted killing as a counterterrorism policy). 
 35 See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Hamlily v. 
Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009); Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 
2009). 
 36 E.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 208 (D.D.C. 2009).  
[T]he Court concludes that these petitioners are virtually identical to the detainees 
in Boumediene-they are non-citizens who were (as alleged here) apprehended in 
foreign lands far from the United States and brought to yet another country for de-
tention. And as in Boumediene, these petitioners have been determined to be ‘ene-
my combatants,’ a status they contest. 
Id. 
 37 See, e.g., Military Prosecutor v. Omar Mahmud Kassem and Others, 42 I.L.R. 470 (Is-
raeli Mil. Ct. Ramallah, 1969) (holding that the accused were not prisoners of war and there-
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Kingdom, which apply human rights law and domestic criminal law to cases 
stemming from both the conflict in Northern Ireland and the current conflict 
against terrorist groups, traditionally have not engaged in such status deter-
minations.38 
One area in which courts take decidedly different approaches to ju-
dicial involvement is the conditions of detention and treatment of persons. 
Unlike the above issues, treatment does not differ in any significant way 
across the different types of conflicts: international law protects all individ-
uals, including those who have been detained, from cruel or inhuman treat-
ment, or torture, whether in international armed conflict, non-international 
armed conflict, or non-conflict situations. However, the conditions of deten-
tion and treatment of individuals often involves direct challenges to individ-
uals within the top echelon of government and for that reason can spark 
interesting interplays between the courts and the executive.39  
Finally, a topic that has proven to be relevant in the past decade or 
more involves the role courts can play in definitions under international law 
and IHL. The most prevalent example appears in the Guantanamo detainee 
litigation in the U.S. federal courts, when numerous judges had to interpret 
the term “enemy combatant” and then provide further definition for use in 
judicial analysis.40 Other terms that have sparked debate regarding defini-
tions include direct participation in hostilities and even torture, in some in-
  
fore not entitled to combatant immunity); HCJ 6659/06, Anonymous v. State of Israel [2008] 
(Isr.), available at elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04.pdf (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants law).  
 38 See, e.g., R v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 58 (appeal taken from Eng.), 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd071212/jedda-
1.htm (basing the dismissal of appellant’s claim, that the detention of the appellant by U.K. 
forces in Iraq was unlawful, on the finding that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 took 
primacy over the U.K.’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights); Al-
Skeini v. Sec’y of State for Def. [2007] UKHL 26 (appeal taken from Eng.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldjudgmt/jd070613/skeini-1.htm (deter-
mining that the extraterritorial meaning of “jurisdiction” applied to U.K.-run detention facili-
ties, but not areas where U.K. soldiers were temporarily present). 
 39 See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (addressing the qualified 
immunity of government officials which shields them from civil liability if their conduct 
doesn’t violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known). See generally Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 
2006) (involving a former detainee’s action against Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld, for 
alleged mistreatment while in U.S. military detention). 
 40 E.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d. 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2008). 
[An enemy combatant is an] an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban 
or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the 
United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed 
a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces. 
Id. 
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stances.41 Here the interplay between the willingness of courts to address the 
existence of an armed conflict or the type of armed conflict relates directly 
to the likelihood that a court will apply IHL to the definition of terms. Once 
a court passes the threshold of application of IHL after finding that a con-
flict exists, or determining the type of conflict, parties can feel a greater 
sense of confidence in the court’s use of IHL to flesh out the definitions at 
issue. From a different angle, an executive branch that can contain the ap-
plication of IHL by the judiciary and promote the supremacy of domestic 
law will have significantly greater success with judicial application of its 
own definitions even when they conflict with IHL. 
III. FACTORS TO ANALYZE AND ANTICIPATE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 
The threshold analysis above helps identify the types of cases where 
IHL does or may play a role. But that is only the first step. Once a court 
takes a case, and even after the court seems amenable to the application of 
IHL, a host of additional factors bear on when the court will apply IHL and 
how the court will apply it. Here, the nuances of how IHL relates to domes-
tic law and human rights law and how national courts interact with and look 
to other countries’ courts, regional courts and international courts can well 
be determinative of the court’s use of IHL and, as a result, the outcome of 
the case. 
A. When Courts Do—or Should—Apply IHL 
One primary factor that often arises in situations that involve IHL is 
whether IHL is the only applicable law or whether human rights law, do-
mestic criminal law, constitutional law or other legal regimes also have an 
important contribution to the adjudication of the case. Understanding when 
courts choose to apply IHL alone or in concert with other legal paradigms 
has a direct effect on both litigation strategy and jurisprudential predictabil-
ity and continuity. These considerations also contribute to effective advoca-
cy to press for more frequent and more robust judicial application of IHL. 
A first factor is the suitability of IHL for the analysis at issue in the 
case. Looking back to the categories set forth briefly in the previous section, 
the question of the existence of an armed conflict is highly suitable for the 
application of IHL, which sets forth a framework for determining when an 
armed conflict exists to trigger the law of war. Even in situations in which 
the question arising in the case does not then involve the application of IHL, 
such as appropriations of funds or the tolling of a statute of limitations dur-
ing wartime, IHL gives a clear picture of when events on the ground consti-
  
 41 See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (stating that the scope of the term “direct participa-
tion” remains unsettled). 
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tute an armed conflict.42 Although it is not the only relevant body of law for 
such determinations—domestic law does indeed have an important contri-
bution to make in the constitutional sphere regarding the existence of armed 
conflict—IHL is the lex specialis and the most directly on point.43 In other 
areas, such as treatment, fair trial rights and, potentially, detention in non-
international armed conflict or counterterrorism operations, human rights 
law and other domestic or international legal frameworks have important 
contributions that inform how IHL applies to a particular situation. Here, we 
might thus see courts showing greater reluctance or uncertainty about incor-
porating IHL into their analysis and decisions. 
Second, some of the categories and issues highlighted in the first 
section above may pose greater challenges for a domestic court’s applica-
tion of IHL. These challenges can arise when IHL is not as well developed 
in a particular area—such as the parameters of detention in non-
international armed conflict, for which the authority derives from the prin-
ciple of military necessity, but treaty law offers little in the way of compre-
hensive details. Alternatively, some courts may view the application of IHL 
to complex questions that arise in the intersection between counterterrorism 
and armed conflict as more challenging than the application of domestic 
criminal law or human rights law in such situations, even if IHL is equally 
or more appropriate. 
A third consideration is the range of legal regimes that apply to a 
given case before a domestic court and how they relate to each other. This 
factor is closely related to the suitability factor above, but has a broader 
perspective. In addition to other legal frameworks, this analysis should also 
take into account whether there are judicial or other legal doctrines that im-
pact how a court views a case, such as state secrets or the political question 
doctrine. While some alternative sources of law can be helpful in the adju-
dication or resolution of a particular issue, some can also be potentially 
problematic for the protection of individual rights and the fulfillment of 
fundamental principles. A first level of analysis therefore would consider 
how many other legal regimes are relevant and how they all interrelate, 
which can offer some clues into not only how a court would and should 
view the contribution IHL can make to the case’s resolution, but also how 
many other legal principles are central to the issues at hand. At a second 
level, we can look to the centrality of the IHL principles at the heart of the 
  
 42 See e.g., United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436 (D. Mass. 2008) (finding there 
was an armed conflict in existence in Afghanistan for the purposes of determining whether 
the statute of limitations for fraud was tolled by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act). 
 43 See Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law and In-
ternational Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 ISR. L. REV. 310, 347 
(2007) (stating as a general rule humanitarian law is the most appropriate for the conduct of 
hostilities).  
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case in viewing how a court should approach political question determina-
tions. In the U.S. at least, courts tend to defer to the executive on wartime 
matters;44 however, it is precisely when wartime cases strike at the very core 
principles of IHL that a court should rethink that automatic deference and 
focus on the rights and obligations demanding protection and fulfillment. At 
the opposite end of the spectrum, the Israeli Supreme Court is the epitome 
of robust judicial engagement during wartime, hearing cases in real-time on 
issues ranging from the conduct of military operations to the protection of 
civilians to detention of suspected terrorists.45 
Finally, while some cases invoke strictly—or at least predominant-
ly—IHL concepts and principles, such as the treatment of prisoners of war, 
others will trigger central domestic law principles that perhaps trump the 
relevant IHL principles. The lessons of the past decade’s conflict between 
states and terrorist groups demonstrates that, in fact, IHL principles will 
most often come up against domestic political considerations that simply 
overrun or circumvent the basic law of war tenets. For example, the U.S. 
has charged some detainees at Guantanamo Bay with the offense of murder 
in violation of the law of war. This crime does not exist within the corpus of 
the international law of war,46 but such arguments have been denied, per-
haps due to the desire to find a way to criminalize enemy participation in 
hostilities against U.S. servicemen and women. Understanding how domes-
tic law and interpretive doctrines, as well as political considerations, will 
impact how courts incorporate IHL or defer in such cases. 
  
 44 WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 223–
24(1998) (recognizing that the Supreme Court generally gave the executive branch more 
leeway during times of crisis). See generally Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, Going Toe to 
Toe: President Barack’s and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Theories of Judicial Activism, 29 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51, 56–57 (2005) (reviewing U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
in wartime and comparing to the approach of the Israeli Supreme Court). 
 45 HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank 57 (2) PD 349 [2002] (Isr.) 
(mandating increased safeguards for detainees during the course of the operation); HCJ 
3799/02 Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. The Minister of 
Defense (2) IsrLR 206 [2005] (Isr.) (holding that the consensual use of a civilian to warn 
suspected terrorists before a military operation to detain them is unlawful under the Fourth 
Geneva Convention). 
 46 See Geoffrey Corn, Understanding the Limitations on Involving the Courts-Martial 
Option for Trying Captured Terrorists, 17 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 1, 18 
(2009). 
There is simply no basis to assert that the mere participation in a non-international 
armed conflict by a non-state actor violates international law. Instead, those indi-
viduals become internationally liable for their acts or omissions only when those 
acts or omissions violate norms of conduct applicable to this type of armed con-
flict. 
Id. 
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B. How Do—and Should—Courts Apply IHL? 
Once a court does incorporate IHL into its analysis, either as the 
dominant legal paradigm or as one of multiple sources that bear on the case 
at hand, a range of additional factors are relevant for understanding how 
courts will approach this task. As noted above, IHL is fundamentally inter-
national law but also forms part of the domestic law of most states. How a 
court chooses to address IHL’s key provisions, principles and obligations 
will vary widely depending not only on the categories of issues detailed in 
the first section above, but also on how the court relates to other courts in 
the international system, how it views international law in general, and other 
considerations. 
The first, and most foundational, factor is how international law is 
incorporated into or viewed in relation to a state’s domestic law. For exam-
ple, states with a monist system treat international treaties as automatically 
incorporated into national law;47 in states with a dualist tradition, interna-
tional law must be translated into national law through legislation.48 In the 
U.S., another consideration is whether a particular treaty—and concomitant 
international obligation—is self-executing, meaning it has direct effect as 
law in domestic courts.49 In the case of the Geneva Conventions, the prima-
ry modern law of war treaties, states take different approaches to how these 
treaty obligations are incorporated into national law. Some states have legis-
lation implementing the Geneva Conventions and the obligations therein;50 
some have national traditions—such as monism—that automatically give 
  
 47 See Myres S. McDougal, The Impact of International Law Upon National Law: A Poli-
cy-Oriented Perspective, 4 S.D. L. REV. 25, 26 (1959); see also John R. Stevenson, The Rela-
tionship of Private International Law to Public International Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 561 
(1952).  
 48 See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 14–16 (1986) 
(claiming that international law must bow to domestic authority); MICHAEL AKEHURST, 
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (1982) (elaborating on the English law 
doctrine of transformation which rules that international customary law forms a part of Eng-
lish law only so far as parliament and judicial decisions recognize). 
 49 See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, International Agreements and U.S. Law, AM. SOC’Y OF 
INT’L LAW INSIGHTS (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.asil.org/insigh10.cfm (explaining that a 
self-executing treaty provision is the supreme law of the land in the same sense as a federal 
statute that is judicially enforceable by private parties and that even a non-self-executing 
provision of an international agreement represents an international obligation that courts are 
very much inclined to protect against encroachment by local, state or federal law).  
 50 See Michael Bothe, The Role of National Law in the Implementation of International 
Humanitarian Law, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
RED CROSS PRINCIPLES 301, 304–05 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984) (describing the differ-
ent mechanisms a country may use to enact a treat into its domestic laws).  
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the Conventions the full force of domestic law.51 In others, such as in the 
U.S., the approach to the Geneva Conventions has proven more complex, 
with courts debating the applicability of the Conventions and Congress 
passing legislation declaring that the Geneva Conventions cannot be used as 
a source of rights in U.S. domestic courts.52 
IHL is more than the Geneva Conventions and other treaties, how-
ever. Customary law plays a substantial role in the law of war and the obli-
gations of states to conduct hostilities in a lawful manner and protect civil-
ians from the ravages of war.53 Understanding how particular courts view 
customary law is therefore an important part of anticipating how the law of 
war will be incorporated into national court decisions and jurisprudence. 
Beyond the willingness—or unwillingness—of courts to contemplate cus-
tomary international law, the manner in which such courts explore and de-
termine the content of customary law is central to this analysis as well. Is 
the court conservative in its understanding of the content and development 
of customary international law or does it take an expansive view, one that 
might encapsulate modern trends in conflict and still burgeoning develop-
ments in the law? These questions arise in a range of international legal 
issues, such as Alien Tort Statute litigation in the U.S., but are particularly 
important in the IHL arena, where the pace of developments on the ground 
is extremely quick and customary law often develops “in the reverse”, based 
on reactions to violations rather than on statements of opinio juris.54 
Finally, examining how courts treat comparative, regional and in-
ternational jurisprudence can help determine both how welcoming courts 
are to the application of IHL in general and, more specifically, how courts 
are likely to view and interpret the content of IHL. A greater comfort level 
with non-national jurisprudence will likely correspond with a less rigid fo-
  
 51 See Eric Rosenthal & Clarence J. Sundram, International Human Rights in Mental 
Health Legislation, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 469, 480 (2002); see also MARK W. 
JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (1988) (explaining that some monist 
countries automatically enforce treaties while other dualist countries have a more common 
two-step process).  
 52 Military Commission Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.A. § 948b (2009); see also e.g., Hamdan, 
415 F.3d at 40 (holding, in part, that the 1949 Geneva Conventions do not give an enemy 
combatant the right to enforce its provisions in court), rev’d, Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 560 (hold-
ing that the Military Commissions Act failed to satisfy the Geneva Conventions); Noriega v. 
Pastrana, 564 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the Military Commissions Act 
prevented former Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega from using the Geneva Conventions to 
challenge his extradition to France). 
 53 See generally Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 348, 348–49 (1987). 
 54 See Jonathan B. Lancton, The Alien Tort Statute and Customary International Law: The 
Judicial Albatross Hanging Around the Executive’s Neck, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1081, 1100–09 
(2010) (explaining the difference between a state’s actions and its statements, or opinio ju-
ris). 
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cus on the singularity of domestic law and greater ease in incorporating 
international law in general. In the area of IHL, this translates into a broader 
interpretation of IHL beyond the domestic lens, raising the potential of a 
richer treatment of the issues in the case and how the law can be applied. 
The relationship between regional or international courts and national courts 
is an important piece of this analysis as well. Within the European system, 
governments and national courts are bound by decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Any analysis of how domestic courts 
within Europe are incorporating or will incorporate IHL must therefore take 
into account how IHL issues arise and are or may be addressed in the 
ECHR.55 The role of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals and special 
courts is far less defined with regard to the force of their jurisprudence as 
precedent in national courts, but understanding how various domestic courts 
treat this international jurisprudence is helpful in analyzing whether and 
how they will incorporate the content of the legal analysis and determina-
tions in those cases. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The effective implementation and enforcement of IHL in national 
courts does not begin and end with the matching of legal rights and obliga-
tions to facts on the ground. A more nuanced and sophisticated analysis of 
how, when and whether courts are likely to engage in IHL-specific legal 
analysis is critical to legal advocacy, jurisprudential predictability and oper-
ational decision-making. Thus, the strategic approach set forth above high-
lights a set of circumstances and factors that delineate when a court will 
take one approach rather than another, decisions that have direct impact on 
the outcome of cases and the future implementation of the law by political 
and military actors. Finally, this analysis helps to identify which courts are 
contributing to the continued development of IHL both through active judi-
cial engagement with complex and challenging issues and by imposing ju-
dicial review on the executive branch. 
  
 55 See Michele D’Avolio, Regional Human Rights Courts and Internal Armed Conflicts, 2 
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 284–85 (2007) (explaining although the ECHR is a 
human rights court, it has heard numerous cases addressing situations arising in armed con-
flict—such as in Chechnya—and therefore the relationship and its jurisprudence are a highly 
relevant factor). 
